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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to develop a water allocation and technology adoption 
model under the prior appropriation doctrine that recognizes informational asymmetry among 
water users and between water users and water authorities.  We consider informational 
asymmetry about the agent's type, defined by a mix of land quality and knowledge.  Adverse 
selection is found to significantly reduce the adoption of modern irrigation technology and to 
lead to less retirement of poor quality lands than under full information.  Further investigation 
shows that even with asymmetric information, incentives for water trades can exist and lead to 
additional technology adoption with gains to all parties.  Our results suggest that under 
asymmetric information, even a thin secondary market can improve the allocation of water 
resources. 
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EFFICACY OF WATER TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 





Although markets have the potential for allocating scarce resources for which property 
rights have been well defined in an efficient manner, agricultural water markets are not 
unanimously accepted as being an efficient mechanism for allocating scarce water resources 
among agricultural producers.  Authors like Freyfogle consider that "many of the inefficiencies 
have to do with imperfect information, transaction costs, and inadequate numbers of willing 
buyers and sellers" while Livingston (1993) argues that markets for water fail to achieve 
efficiency because water use "suffers from information deficiencies" among other reasons.   
These information deficiencies may arise because farmers are heterogeneous in their soil 
conditions and thus in the value of water to them (Freyfogle) and because stochastic factors 
influence and the relationship between applied water and agricultural output (Saliba and Bush).  
Information asymmetry might exist regarding land quality and input requirements under different 
weather conditions between water users themselves and between the regulator and water users. 
Asymmetric information may also impede the determination of water quotas under the 
prior appropriation doctrine which in a number of regions assigns not only a seniority rule for 
water usage but also limits water use through quotas determined by water authorities.  A close 
reading of the legislation of some countries like Japan (Nakashima) or some states in the US (e.g. 
Oregon, Idaho, Colorado, and Utah) reveals that the date and time stamp on the application 
establish the priority of the right.  The water quota and fees for the water are determined by the 
water agency according to the intended use and the availability of the resources. The U.S. Bureau Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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of Reclamation recommends setting water rates that would lead to efficient use of water but 
recognizes the difficulties that might arise from "gathering the technical details to support the 
design and administration of workable rate schedules."  Water quotas and fees determined either 
by the water agency or by water markets can affect both the quantity of water used and choice of 
irrigation technologies which determine the effectiveness with which that water is used for 
irrigation. 
In this paper, we develop a framework to examine the determination of water quotas and 
water fees to allocate scarce water among farmers, while recognizing the prevailing prior 
appropriations doctrine and the informational asymmetry about the farmer's type, defined by a 
mix of land quality and knowledge.  We develop a mechanism to price irrigation water and 
assign water quotas, and examine its implications for adoption of modern irrigation technologies 
and water use as compared to those under full information. We then establish conditions under 
which a water market could induce trading and additional technology adoption and thereby 
increase social welfare.  Our model is appropriate for surface water used by farmers in 
agriculture.  We have limited the study to the agricultural uses of water since more than 70% of 
surface water resources are being used for agricultural purposes.  In our model, water allocation 
is based on the prior appropriation doctrine which is widely prevailing, in the United States, 
where water experience is the most documented.  We focus on water trading in a thin spot-
market; this naturally implies that water sellers enjoy a limited market power, since the upper 
bound for prices depends on water marginal productivity for the buyers.  Because of the 
bulkiness of water, for any trade to occur it has to be geographically confined and most likely 
among few water users, which justifies the thinness of the market.  In addition, we assume away Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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any third-party effects
1 related to the transfer or trade of water rights.  This limitation is not 
without consequences but to keep matters simple we do not address that issue here (for a 
treatment involving market power and third-party effects under full information see Saleth et al.). 
Our study differs from existing literature on irrigation technology adoption and water 
markets in several ways.  There are several studies that have focused only on analyzing 
technology adoption decisions under perfect information (Caswell and Zilberman) and 
uncertainty about water availability (Carey and Zilberman) or examined the design of incentive 
compatible mechanisms for water pricing under the riparian doctrine (Smith and Tsur). Caswell 
and Zilberman assume that farmers have access to water without regulation on quantities in a full 
information context while Smith and Tsur focus on water pricing with riparian rights and with 
asymmetric information.  They do not consider the possibility of water trading concerns or 
technology adoption.  Carey and Zilberman, show that under uncertainty about water 
availability, water markets increases (decreases) the incentive to adopt modern irrigation 
technology for farmers with abundant (scarce) water quotas.  Shah et al., consider water trading 
under full information and show that in the absence of water trading, senior water right holders 
have no incentives to adopt modern irrigation technology and they irrigate all their land, which 
leaves the junior right holder with little or no water.  Existing studies show that water markets for 
surface water for agricultural uses are efficient under perfect information and create incentives 
for adoption of modern irrigation technologies (Dinar and Letey; Shah et al.).  However they 
ignore an important aspect of the problem, namely the inefficiencies in water use and pricing 
introduced by asymmetric information and whether water markets may, even then, improve 
efficiency relative to the status quo. 
                                                 
1 The change in the pattern of water use might generate additional pollution related to return flows and lower water 
levels that might affect economic activities located downstream. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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In addition to a two-sided information asymmetry, what distinguishes our trading 
situation from most bilateral bargaining literature (Myerson and Satterthwaite; McKelvey and 
Page) is that both buyer and seller have a positive initial endowment in the traded good, here 
water rights.  This distinction implies that trade is not confined to a single direction; rather it can 
exist in either direction.  Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that a direct revelation mechanism 
leading to trade might not always exist and that such mechanism is not always ex-post efficient.  
Their work is based on a single indivisible item where the buyer and the seller utilities are linear. 
  McKelvey and Page generalized the work of Myerson and Satterthwaite to the case of a 
divisible item and nonlinear utilities to show in addition that under adverse selection there is a 
bias toward the status quo.  For the above authors the existence of trade was compromised by the 
indivisibility of the good and by the unilateral endowment of resources. 
The main results of the paper are that adverse selection leads to less adoption of modern 
irrigation technology and to less retirement of poor quality lands.  However when an incentive 
mechanism is designed through a discriminatory pricing mechanism, water quotas for senior 
right holders can be reduced thus allowing for more junior right holders to use water.  This 
comes at the expense of lower water fees collected from the high quality farmers who use the 
traditional irrigation technology.  We find that when adverse selection prevails between the water 
agency and the farmers, the use of incentive mechanism alone cannot achieve the best allocation 
of water by the regulator and that a secondary water trading phase or "second market" should be 
considered to improve the allocation of water.  We show that even under asymmetric 
information, surface water markets can increase social efficiency of water allocation and lead to 
more modern irrigation technology adoption than the non-trading situation.  Allowing water 
trading has the potential to mitigate some of the inefficiencies due to adverse selection without Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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inducing further budgetary strain on the regulator, while inducing more modern technology 
adoption. 
This paper is organized as follows; in the next section, we describe and discuss our model 
and its assumptions.  In section three, we start with a benchmark version of the model where 
information is symmetric, as in Caswell and Zilberman and there is no water trading but water 
use is regulated.  In section four, we introduce adverse selection and examine its implications in 
the absence of water trading.  We then examine how water trading offers a correction to some of 
the inefficiencies generated by adverse selection.  In the fifth section, we present a numerical 
illustration to gain more insights that could not be obtained analytically.  In the conclusion, a 
summary of the results and discussion of the shortcomings and extensions conclude the paper. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
We consider N farmers, indexed by i=1,…,N according to the seniority of their water rights 
producing the same crop and facing an output price P. Farmers are heterogeneous in their type 
(e.g. land quality and skills) denoted by  i θ  which is assumed to be independently distributed 
with density  () i f θ  and a cumulative distribution  ( ) i F θ  over the support  , θ θ   . Farmers are 
assumed to have a choice of two irrigation technologies,  , tL H =  where L is the traditional 
technology (such as furrow irrigation) and H is the modern technology such as sprinkler or drip. 










where 1 i α =  if the traditional technology is adopted (tL = ) and  ] [ 0,1 i α ∈  if the modern Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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technology is being adopted (tH = )
2.  The function  (.)
t
i h  can be thought of as the percentage of 
water absorbed or used effectively by the plant, hence it is bounded by 1 at  i θ θ = .  Regardless 
of the technology adopted, the percentage of water absorbed by the plant is zero at  i θ θ =  which 
is the case if land is sandy, steep, or rocky.  For realistic values of  i α ,  () ()
HL
ii i i hh θ θ >  and the 
difference decreases as  i θ  increases; thus the modern irrigation technology benefits farmers with 
low types more than those who have high types.  The fixed cost per acre of the traditional 
technology is  0
L c = , while of the modern technology is  0
H c > .  Assuming constant returns to 
scale and a quadratic functional form, the production function for farmer i is, 
() () () { }
2
,() m a x  ()  (), 0
tt tt tt
ii i i i i i ywh db w h a w h θθ θ =− + − , where  i y  is yield per acre, 
0, 0, and  0 ab d >> ≥  are constants and 
t
i w is the quantity of water used per acre by farmer i 
using technology t. 
Assumption 1: The quadratic production function suggests the existence of a water 
quantity yielding a maximum output at  2 ( ) 0
tt










  For every unit of water, there is a private cost k of diverting water from its source to the 
field.  Additionally, the per-unit cost of water is g .  The profit function for farmer i under 
technology t is thus defined by: 
() () ,() ,()
tt t t t t t t
i iii i iii i i wh P ywh k w g w c πθ θ =− − −        (1) 
                                                 
2 Caswell and Zilberman define land quality to be the same as irrigation effectiveness under the traditional 
technology and taking values from [ ] 0,1 .  For generality, in our model we make a distinction between the 
parameter of land quality or agents' types,  , i θ θθ   ∈  , and the effectiveness of irrigation technology,  ()
t
ii h θ . Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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The total quantity of water available to farmers in the region is w; farmers divert water 
according to the prior appropriation doctrine, the priority is set when they apply for water rights. 
Assumption 2: We consider that water is scarce; in the sense that there is, no 
configuration of  i θ 's under which all farmers can maximize their profits simultaneously. 
  Without the above assumption, any study of water allocation is pointless; an implication 
of this assumption is that for different allocation schemes there are some farmers who may be 
left without water.  Recall that under the prior appropriation doctrine when there is water 
shortage, only the senior rights holders receive their quotas of water while the rest of the rights 
remain partially or completely unfulfilled. 
If we denote by  ()
tt t
ii i i eh w θ = , the quantity of effective water used when technology t is 
being implemented, Caswell and Zilberman define the elasticity of marginal productivity of 













, and show that the optimal quantity of applied water 
t
i w  
is decreasing with respect to the farmer's type
3 if  1
t
i emp > . 
Assumption 3: For  ()
tt t













 is greater than 



















                                                 
3 Caswell and Zilberman argue that cases were the quantity of applied water is an increasing function of types, are 
not realistic and not supported neither by production theory nor by empirical evidence, example of such functions 
includes the Cobb-Douglas production function. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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  Considered together, assumptions 1 and 3 imply that in order to be X-efficient with 












 from above.  For  ,
s
i θ θθ   ∈  , where 
s θ  solves 
LH
ii π π =  
such that  0
H
i π > , farmers adopt the modern technology (t=H) since 
H L
ii π π ≥  and  0
H
i π > , for 
,
s
i θ θθ  ∈  the traditional technology is selected (t=L), therefore the proportion of farmers 
adopting the modern irrigation technology is  ( ) ( )
s z FF θ θ − , where 
z θ  is such that  0
H
i π = . 
WATER ALLOCATION UNDER FULL INFORMATION: PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
In this section, we consider the problem of the regulator who has to decide on water 
quotas for every water user while recognizing the seniority of the farmer and the constraint on 
total water availability.  The regulator determines each farmer’s quota to maximize the social 
benefit generated by that allocation. 
Livingston (1998) reports the existence of water commissioners who act as "River Cops", 
who monitor the use of water and ensure that it respects the established priorities and allocation 
levels.  Such activity is costly to society and the per-monetary-unit cost is represented by 
10 λ >>  where λ is similar to the costs of raising public funds as in Browning.  The social gain 




,() ,() ( 1 )
                       =  (1 )
tt t tt t t t
i iii i iii i i
tt tt t t t
ii ii i i
Sw h w h g w g w




−+ − − − + −
   (2) 
  Expression (2) represents the farmer’s profit and the regulator's revenue net of the cost of 
monitoring and collecting water fees 
t
i gw λ .  Under full information the regulator's problem is: 
() max , ( )      s.t.     0
t
i
tt t t t
ii i i i l
w li
Sw h w w w θ
<
≤≤ − ∑        (3) Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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=−      ;  for  1 j∗ −   farmers     (4) 













=− ∑ , and the 





> = , the proportion of farmers adopting the 
modern irrigation technology is  () ( )
z FF θ θ
∗∗ −  where 
z θ
∗  solves  0
H
i π = . 
For  0 λ = , water use is given by 
0








=−  as shown in Dridi.  As λ 
increases water quotas for the senior right holders decrease and some low-type water users could 
be replaced by users of higher type that had low seniority of right.  This water quota reduction 
could correct the unequal risk sharing due to water scarcity between senior right holders and 
junior right holder as shown by Burness and Quirk. 
WATER RIGHTS ALLOCATION AND TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
We now introduce adverse selection to examine a water allocation scheme when water 
pricing is not linear and not uniform across users (i.e. second-degree price discrimination), like 
the type suggested by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.  We also show that even when there is 
asymmetric information, water trading could exist and could induce greater technology adoption 
than otherwise. 
Regulated Water Allocation under Adverse Selection 
Consider the case the land quality parameter  i θ  is unknown to parties other than farmer i. 
 In this setting, water users when applying for a water right reveal a parameter  ˆ
i θ  about their 
characteristic; the revealed parameter is not necessarily the true parameter  i θ .  The regulator’s Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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task is now to determine a contract consisting of a water quota and a corresponding water fee 
() { } ˆˆ () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  for every parameter  ˆ
i θ .  The above contract needs a revelation 
mechanism. 
Let  () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ , () , () ()
tt t
ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θ Π= − − Φ , the profit realized by a farmer i 
when its true type is  i θ  and it announces  ˆ
i θ .  The pair  ( ) { } ˆˆ () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  is a truth-telling 
mechanism if for every  i θ  and  ˆ
i θ  in  , θ θ    , the farmers profit when his type is  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) and 
reveals  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) is greater than his profit when his type is  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) and reveals  ˆ
i θ  
(resp. i θ ): 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ () , () () () , () ()
tt t tt t
ii i ii ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θθ θ −− Φ ≥ −− Φ    (5) 
and 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () , () () () , () ()
tt t tt t
ii i ii ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θθ θ −− Φ ≥ −− Φ    (6) 
We show in the appendix that this requires that ( )
t
ii w θ  is a decreasing function of  i θ , and we use 
that to determine the appropriate level of water fee that makes the pair  () { } () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  an 
incentive compatible contract.  The first-order condition for truth telling (the value of  ˆ
i θ  that 















           ( 7 )  
  To make less burdensome the notation we use a dot on top of the variable to designate the 
derivative with respect to  i θ .  Expression (7) implies: Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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() () ( ) 2 ()
()2 () () () 0
()
t
ii tt t t
ii ii ii ii t
ii
w






−− − = 
∂  
      (8) 
  If we take  () ( ) () ,() ,
tt t
ii ii i i i wh π θθ θ θ =Π , then using (8) or the envelope theorem, the 
total derivative of 
t
i π  with respect to  i θ  is: 
() 2
tt t t t
ii i i i Ph w b ah w π =−             ( 9 )  
Integrating expressions (9) between θ  and  i θ , and equating it to the profit expression in 
(1), then ex-post the optimal water tariff is obtained by a rearrangement: 
() ( ) ( ) ,() ( ) ,( )
i
tt t t t t t t
ii i i ii i i i wP y w h k w c w u h u d u
θ
θ
θπ Φ= − − − ∫      
We can therefore state the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: A pair  ( ) { } () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  constitutes an incentive compatible 











           ( 1 0 )  
and 
() ( ) ( ) ()  () ,()   () ( ) ,( )
i
tt t t t t t t
ii i ii ii ii i i i wP y w hk w cw u h u d u
θ
θ
θθ θ θ π Φ= −− − ∫     (11) 
where 
() ( ) () , ()  ()  () 2 ()  ()
tt t t t t t
ii i i i i i wuhu P huwub a huwu π =−   ,  [ ] , i u θ θ ∀∈    (12) 
 
  Proposition 1 establishes the relation between  ( )
t
ii w θ  and  i θ  and the relation between the 








Φ .  The water fee schedule in (11) 
imposes second-degree price discrimination, since users are offered different water quantities at 
different prices, but all users of the same type pay the same price for a given water quantity.  The Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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properties of the above water schedule cannot be studied analytically because the sign of the 
derivatives with respect to the farmer’s type cannot be determined and the derivatives with 
respect to water quantity cannot be obtained in a closed form due to the complexity of the 
integral function in (11).  A computational illustration in the next section is provided to give 
additional insights about the shape of the water fee schedule.  We now turn to an examination of 
the water quotas allocated under asymmetric information. 
Expressions (10) and (12) form the incentive compatible constraints in the regulator 
problem.  After rearrangement, the social gain function for the i
th farmer is: 
() ( ) () ()
2
,() =  ( 1 -) () ()
tt t t t t t t t t t
i iii i ii i ii i i i Sw h Pdb w h a w h k w c g w θλ θ θ λ π −+ − − − + −  (13) 
In this scenario the regulator's problem is: 
()
,




ii ii i i i
w




θ θθ θ ∫   subject to  (10), (12), and  0
t
i π ≥   (14) 
 
 With  ( ) i µ θ  the Pontryagin multiplier and considering only constraint (12), we obtain the 
following Hamiltonian: 
() ( ) () () ( )
()
2
,, =  ( 1 - ) ( )
                        ( ) 2
t t tt tt t t t t
ii i i i i i i i i
tt tt
ii i i i
Hw P d b w h aw h k w c g w f
Ph w b ah w
π µλ λ π θ
µθ




  The first-order conditions are: 
 
() () ()
2 (1 ) ( 2 ( ) ) 4 0
tt t t t t
ii i i i i t
i
H




=− − − − + − =
∂









            ( 1 7 )  
() 2
tt t t t
ii i i i Ph w b ah w π =−             ( 1 8 )  Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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() 0 µθ =             ( 1 9 )  
() 0
t
i πθ=             ( 2 0 )  
  Integrating (17) between  i θ  and θ  and using (19) gives: 
() () 1 () ii F µ θλ θ =−            ( 2 1 )  
 Replacing  () µ θ  in (16) by its value from (21) we get the optimal quantity of water: 
() ( )
()
(1 ) ( ) (1 )





Pb h h R g k
w
aPh h h R
λ λθ λ
λλ θ





















  Expression (21) shows that the Pontryagin multiplier,  ( ) µ θ , which represents the 
marginal contribution of  () .
t
i π  to  ( ) .
t
i S  ranges from λ  to zero for all  , i θ θθ  ∈ , this implies 
that when  i θ θ =  the contribution of  ( ) .
t
i π  to  ( ) .
t
i S  is maximized. 
  Recall that we solved the model in (14) in its relaxed version without constraints (10) and 
0
t
i π ≥ .  However, this solution would hold even in the presence of these constraints because 
from (7) we see that 
t
i π   is positive thus, its integral function with respect to  i θ  must also be 
positive.  This monotonicity condition may not always be fulfilled, our numerical analysis in the 
next section shows that it is the case for low values of  i α .  Special provisions would be needed 
to ensure monotonicity (see Laffont and Martimort, p. 141-142), the idea is to find a compromise 
between two extreme values of the function over the interval where it is non-monotonic and 
transform the function into a straight line between those two points, this is also known as 
bunching or pooling. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
DRAFT – Do not cite without authors permission  14
In this scenario, with adverse selection, the optimal amount of water is less than the 




≤  (see appendix for proof).  When an 
incentive mechanism is designed through a pricing mechanism, water quotas are reduced thus 




≤  one expects a priori to have 
more retirement of lands of poor quality under this scheme.  However, the fact that in equation 
(20) the optimal control problem we solved grants a zero profit for the farmer whose type is θ  
( () 0
t
i πθ= ), and the fact that the ex-post profit is continuous and strictly increasing
4 with respect 
to farmer's type implies the absence of any land retirement at low levels of  i θ .  Therefore the 
proportion of farmers adopting the modern technology is  ( ) F θ
∗∗ .  If we wanted to include the 
possibility of the retirement of poor quality lands, then we would need to start the integration in 
(12) at a level higher than θ .  However, truncation of the support  , θ θ     through regulatory 





increases the number of water users' whose quotas is satisfied but does not induce any retirement 
of poor quality lands.  Since the profit expression in (12) is not analytically tractable, the 
technology adoption behavior of farmers is analyzed numerically in the next section. 
Water Bilateral Trading and Asymmetric Information 
We now show that even under adverse selection, water trading is possible and is 
beneficial to the trading parties and might induce more modern technology adoption.  Our 
concern is to establish the conditions under which water trading occurs and to appraise the 
                                                 
4 See equation (18) and consider the X-efficiency condition. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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volume of trade.  Based on the realized level of trades we explore the nature of technology 
adoption induced by water trading. 









determined in the previous subsection. Their corresponding profits are  () ,()
tt t
ii i i wh π θ
∗∗ ∗∗  and 
() ,()
tt t
jj i j wh π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ .  Agents whose type is below θ
∗∗ adopt the modern irrigation technology 
while agents whose type is above θ
∗∗ adopt the modern technology.  The reservation levels of 
profits will be taken from the previous model based on the determined water quota and the 
choice of irrigation technology.  We implicitly assume that disinvestment is not possible, indeed 
while equipment can be sold investments made to learn how to use it are not recoverable, 
therefore once the modern technology is acquired it cannot be abandoned. 
If trade occurs between i and j, then we denote by  ( , ) ij ij i j xx θ θ ≡  the quantity of water 
traded between a farmer of type  i θ  and a farmer of type  j θ  against a monetary transfer of 
() ji ij mx, from j to i.  When trade occurs the profit functions for i and j are respectively: 
( ) () () ( ) () ()
2
,( ) ( )
tt t t t t t t t
i i j i ii i j ii i j i i j i j i i j x hP d b h wxa h wx k wxc w m x π
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ =− + − − − − − − − Φ +
(23) 
( ) () () ( ) () ()
2
,( ) ( )
t t tt tt t t t
j i j j jj i j jj i j j i j j j i i j x hP d b h wxa h wx k wxc w m x π
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ =− + + − + − + − − Φ −
(24) 
We consider the existence of a benevolent broker or a facilitator, like an irrigation district 
(Landry) or a water bank (Howitt) whose objective is to maximize the sum of the seller and the 
buyer profits or the social gain generated by the trade.  Under asymmetric information, the 
broker's problem is not limited to satisfying the equality of marginal profits across the two Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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trading farmers.  Consider the direct revelation mechanism where agents i and j reveal their types 
to the broker. 
Let  () ˆ (, ) ,()
t
ii j ij ii xh θ θθ Π  be farmer i's profit when he reports a type  ˆ
i θ  to the broker 
while his true type is  i θ .  Similarly for farmer j we have  ( ) ˆ (, ) , ()
t
ji j ij jj xh θ θθ Π .  The broker's 
problem is to maximize the ex-post expected sum of profits: 
() () ()
(.) max . .
ij
ij
ij x EE θθΠ+ Π           ( 2 5 )  
such that; 
() ( ) ˆ (, ) ,() (, ) , ()
jj
tt
ii j ij ii ii j ij ii Ex h Ex h θθ θ θθ θ θθ Π≥ Π     ( 2 6 )  
() ( ) ˆ (, ) , () (, ) , ()
ii
tt
ji j ij jj ji j ij jj Ex h Ex h θθ θ θθ θ θθ Π≥ Π      ( 2 7 )  
() () (, ) , () ,()
tt t t t
ii j i ji i i i i i xh w h π θθ θ π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ≥         ( 2 8 )  
() () (, ) , () , ()
tt t t t
ji j ij jj j j jj xh w h π θθ θ π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ≥         ( 2 9 )  
0( , )
t
ij i j i x w θθ
∗∗ ≤≤            ( 3 0 )  
 
  Constraints (26) and (27) are incentive compatibility constraints that ensure truth telling 
by farmers i and j, while constraint (30) limits the volume of trade to the endowments of the 
seller.  Constraints (28) and (29) grant the trading parties a minimum level of profit equal to the 
profit they had before initiating any water trading.  Here we consider ex-post individual 
rationality, which as Gresik stated is a much stronger requirement than the interim individual 
rationality requirement found in a large number of studies.  Indeed the standard in mechanism 
design is interim individual rationality, where the constraints (28) and (29) are replaced by their 
expected values. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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  We start solving the problem described by (25)-(30), by considering only the incentive 
compatible constraints to rewrite the objective function (25) into a sum of expected profits that 
are incentive compatible. 
 For  farmer  i, truth-telling implies: 
() ˆ
ˆ

















         ( 3 1 )  
  Using the envelope theorem or considering (31), the total derivative of 
() (, ) ,()
t
ii j ij ii xh θ θθ Π  with respect to  i θ  is: 
() ( )





                 = ( , ) ( ) 2 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
jj
t i i i
t
ii i
tt t t t
i i jij ii i i jij ii ii j j
E dE h
d h












  (32) 
An agent i whose type is θ , does not enter into a trade because no other agent j can have 
a marginal profit that is higher than agent i's, thus 
() () (, ) , () () , ()
tt t t
ii j j i i i xh w h θ θθ π θ θ π
∗∗ ∗∗ Π= = , which is a constant.  Indeed an agent whose 
type is θ  has the lowest quantity of water by virtue of assumption 3 along with the highest 
productivity, as a result the agent's marginal valuation for water is the highest and no other agent 
can compensate him for reducing water use.  From (32) the incentive compatible profit is 
rewritten as: 
() () () ( )
2









∗∗ ∗∗ Π= − − − − ∫∫
  (33) 
  In order to get the first part of (25), we compute the expected profit of farmer i, and using 
Fubini's theorem we get: Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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π θθ θ θ
∗∗ ∗∗ Π= − − − − ∫∫∫
  
(34) 
  The replication of the above steps for agent j is straightforward.  If farmer j is a buyer 
then having a type equal to θ  would grant the agent a zero profit as required by the constraint 
(20) in the previous section.  A similar procedure to (31) through (34), gives: 









∗∗ ∗∗ Π= + − + ∫∫∫
    (35) 
  Expressions (34) and (35) transform the broker’s problem to maximizing the sum of 
expected profits with respect to the optimal amount of water transfer  () , ij i j x θ θ  that must be 
accompanied by a monetary transfer of  ( ) ji ij mx satisfying the constraints (28)-(30). 
  In (34), observe that in addition to i π , which is fixed, there is an additional quantity that 
represents the expected value of output forgone by i and gained by j, upon the transfer 
of () , ij i j x θ θ  units of water.  It is the later quantity that the broker has to maximize.  If we 
assume the absence of transaction costs related to water trading, then there will be no trace of the 
monetary transfer,  ( ) ji ij mx in (34).  Applying Liebnitz's rule and after simplification the 
maximization of the sum of (34) and (35) with respect to  ( ) , ij i j x θ θ  reduces to the following 
first order condition: 
() () () () () 4 ( ,) () () 4 (, ) () 
j
i
tt t t t t




∗∗ ∗∗ −+ =− +− ∫∫
 (36) Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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If we take the derivative with respect to  i θ  and then with respect to  j θ  on both sides, we get the 
first order condition expressed in the following homogenous parabolic linear partial-differential 
equation of order one and degree one in  ( ) , ij i j x θ θ : 
(.) (.)
()() ()() 0









       ( 3 7 )  
This far, when we introduced adverse selection we assumed that farmer i is the seller and 
that farmer j is the buyer.  Let us assume now that  (.) ij x  is negative and in (37) substitute  (.) ij x  
by (.) ji x −  we get after simplification the same expression as in (37).  This shows that regardless 
of the way we setup the trading problem the trading rule derived in (37) is the same.  Otherwise 
stated, if the broker does not know the true valuations of any two agents and if, the two agents 
are willing to purchase or sell with profit a quantity of an item they each individually own, then 
designating one agent as buyer and the other as seller is irrelevant.  The following proposition 
summarizes the above result. 
Proposition 2: Consider a social gain maximizing broker and two agents i and j with 
initial endowments  i w  and  j w  in a given good and private valuations for the good. Then as long 
as the expected social gain is positive the broker is able to determine an incentive compatible 
trading rule that determines the optimal quantity to trade and its direction irrespective of the 
agents' true valuations for the good. 
In this setting, a broker who acts as the Walrasian auctioneer whose sole role is to match 
the buyers and the sellers without seeking gains from the transaction can bring about mutually 
beneficial agreements between buyers and sellers.  The broker can be an intermediary who due to 
the existence of adverse selection realizes a gain from bringing the buyers and the sellers to an Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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agreement (Spulber).  It is important that the broker be different from the water authority that 
assigns the initial endowments in water.  Unless the relation between the farmers and the 
regulator is changed, the broker cannot improve upon the outcome of the previous subsection.  








Φ  from the previous subsection, are 
considered constants by the broker, thus excluding any revision or renegotiation of the contract 
between the regulator and the farmers. 
  If we omit the constant terms, the anti-derivative of  ()()
tt












 and for 
()()
tt












.  With  0 C  and  1 C  being constants, the general solution for (37) 
is then obtained as follows: 







ij i j j i
ji
x CC
αα α α θ θ θθ θ θ θθ θ θ
αα
+ + 
=− − − − − +   ++ 
 (38) 
  Expression (38) can be checked to be a general solution to (37) where no trade occurs if 
farmers were identical, in which case  1 0 C = .  The constant  0 C  is a scaling factor that can be 
















         ( 3 9 )  
where  () () () () ()








θ θ θθ θ θ θθ θ θ
αα
+ +
=− − − − −
++
. 
  Now that the optimal water trading rule is determined, we need to direct our attention to 
the rest of the constraints of the broker's problem, namely constraints (28)-(30).  If we denote by Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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M
ij x  the optimal level of water trading, for that level to be feasible it has to satisfy the constraints 
below for the monetary transfer, its final level will be determined through negotiation between 
the trading parties: 
() ( ) ( )
2
() () () + ( )
tt t t t t t
ji ij i i i ij i i ij i ij i m x P d b h wxa h wx k wxc πθ θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗  ≥− − + − − − − + + Φ 

  (40) 
() ( ) ( )
2
() () () ( )
tt tt t t t
ji ij j j ij j j ij j ij j j m xP d b h wxa h wx k wx c θ θπ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗  ≤− + +− + − +− − Φ − 

(41) 
  Since the water quotas determined by the regulator in the previous subsection are 
decreasing across farmers' types then it is expected that the higher the farmers' type the higher is 
his marginal valuation for water, this indicates that for trading to generate the highest social gain 
it has to be from the lower type to the higher type farmers.  This means that at the egress of the 
trade some of the farmers who sell part of their water quota will adopt the modern technology 
otherwise the trade will only increase their profits through the revenue of water sales.  The 
adoption of the modern technology is feasible under the following condition: 
() ( ) ( )( ) () () () ()
LH L LH LH
ii j i i i i ii j i i i i Pw x h h b aw x h h c θθ θθ
∗∗ ∗∗  −− − −+ ≥       (42) 
The current section dealt with water use and technology adoption under adverse selection. 
 We showed that the existence of adverse selection makes water regulation inefficient even if a 
nonlinear pricing scheme is devised.  At this point, the problem with the regulation is the absence 
of retirement by unproductive lands.  As a remedy to those inefficiencies, we suggested the use 
of water trading and devised a trading rule that is incentive compatible.  If condition (42) is 
fulfilled, additional technology adoption by the sellers is to be expected.  The existence of water 
trading allows for a better allocation of resources across farmers and gives incentives to adopt Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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better irrigation technologies, while increasing the social welfare in comparison to the non-
trading solution.  Based on the results of various studies showing substantial gains from water 
trading compared to its transaction costs (Easter), we overlooked the existence of transaction 
costs related to the trade.  In the following section, we apply the results found above to a 
numerical illustration from the literature, which will bring addition insights that we were not able 
to uncover analytically. 
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION AND ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS 
  To illustrate the findings of the previous sections and to have additional insights and 
results that could not be provided analytically, we use a numerical illustration.  Based on data 
from southern California and Arizona for fruits and vegetables production, Caswell and 
Zilberman construct a quadratic production function with the following coefficients 
d=-6, b=10.68, and a=1.7, the production function measures the output per acre.  Output price is 
assumed by the authors to be $100 per unit of output.  The additional setup costs required to 
adopt the modern technology are between $50 and $100 per acre; we use the value of 
H c =$75 
to illustrate our results.  Irrigation effectiveness for the traditional technology is different from 
that with the modern technology and the depends on the coefficient  i α .  Caswell and Zilberman 
reported that in the western United States when  0.6 i θ =  the effectiveness of the modern 
technology (drip) is 0.95,  (0.6) 0.95
H h = , implying  0.100413 i α = , that we round to 
0.1, i i α =∀
5.  We use a value of k=15 for the private cost supported by the farmer to use water, 
to cover the cost of the energy to pump water from it source to the field as in Caswell and 
Zilberman, where water is pumped from a well.  We assume also that farmers are charged g=$80 
                                                 
5 We assume that  i α  is the same for all farmers irrespective of i θ . Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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per acre-foot of water.  The average social cost per dollar of water fee collected is reported by 
Boyer and Laffont (p.140) to be  0.3 λ =  in developed economies.  The farmers' type,  i θ , is 












, where z is a Gaussian 
distribution with mean 
2
θ θ +
 and variance 1, and Z its cumulative distribution. 
When water use is regulated, water quotas are determined by water authorities in a social 
gain maximizing fashion; we showed analytically that the water quota is less than the quantity of 
water that would maximize the farmer’s profit.  Figure 1.b, depicts the profit functions under full 
information, and it shows the critical value of farmer's type ( 7.66 θ
∗ = ) below which the modern 
technology is adopted and above which the traditional technology is maintained.  In figure 1.b, 
we do not see any retirement of poor quality lands, this is due to the use of  0.1 α =  to comply 
with the data, in fact for higher values of α  lands retirement does exist as implied analytically.  
Figure 1.d shows the social gain functions and it indicates, as expected, that the threshold level 
for switching technology is at a higher level than the level selected by the farmer in figure 1.b.  
As we stated earlier assumption 3 does not affect the analysis of the technology adoption because 
the increasing portion of water quota for the low technology users falls in the area where the 
modern technology is being used, therefore it is irrelevant. 
 
<< insert figure 1 here >> 
 
The numerical analysis for the adverse selection case is slightly more intricate than in the 
case of full information.  The difficulty arises from the shape of the optimal water quota found in 
equation (22) that, as shown in proposition 2, needs to be monotone decreasing.  Figure 1.a Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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depicts the optimal water quantity for every type of land quality under conditions of adverse 
selection, where one notices that while monotonic decreasing, it approaches extremely high 
values for lower types.  This, a priori should not be a problem except that it violates assumption 
1, the only case where the use of infinite amounts of water is viable to the farmers is when water 
use is subsidized
6.  In order to maintain monotonicity and avoid subsidies, we impose a cap on 
water rights, if the water quota found in (22) is larger than the water quota found in (4), then the 
water quota is set to zero otherwise it is the water quota found in (22) that prevails.  Regarding 
the case of water quota when the modern technology is adopted, a rough way to correct for that 
is to make it monotonic to become as depicted with the thick lines in figure 1.a, by trial and error 
we found that when  4.06 θ ≤ , the water quota needs to be set at a value of about 2.93 units. 
The use of water quotas as depicted in figure 1.a allows for the computation of the 
incentive compatible profits for every farmer's type in (12).  In order to compute the integral 
function we use the summed quadrature formula,  ()
0
0









=+ ∑ ∫ , the step size 
we use is  1/1000 dt = . 
Using the above quadrature formula, the incentive compatible profits are plotted in figure 
1.b, the threshold level for technology switching is located at a much lower level ( 5.22 θ
∗∗ = ) 
than under full information.  The introduction of adverse selection reduces significantly the 
adoption of modern technology and suppresses poor land quality retirement since farmers of all 
types are granted a minimum level of profit equal to zero.  Given the distortions introduced by 
adverse selection one might ask why the regulator does not retire the contract that allows for low 
technology adoption and offers only the one that requires the use of the modern technology.  
                                                 
6 With subsidy, all farmers' types will use only the traditional technology. Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
DRAFT – Do not cite without authors permission  25
Doing so might lower significantly the profits of the most productive farmers; in practice, those 
farmers might choose not to farm any more, and only low productivity farmers will remain in the 
sector which obviously in not desirable by the regulator, because what should have been done is 
the retirement of low quality lands. 
In principal-agent models, it is expected that the social gain obtained under adverse 
selection is always lower than the social gain under full information. The fact that we obtained 
larger social gain under adverse selection when tL = , might seem surprising at first since the 
model under adverse selection is more constrained than under full information, however the fact 
that the pricing method is different across the two scenarios makes the result reasonable.  Under 
full information, the pricing schedule was linear whereas under adverse selection the pricing 
schedule was nonlinear and discriminative.  Form figure 1.c, it can be seen that over a large 
portion of  , θ θ   , the water fee paid under adverse selection is always higher that the one under 
full information when tH = .  In contrast, the water fee paid under adverse selection is always 
less than the water fee paid under full information when tL = , which in part explains the low 
level of technology adoption when adverse selection is considered.  The water fee under adverse 
selection is decreasing over farmer's type and it is lower for farmers who adopt the traditional 
technology (tL = ), to become zero at θ . 
So far we found that the introduction of adverse selection and the use of nonlinear and 
discriminative water pricing although leading to an even lower level of water quotas eliminates 
the retirement of poor quality lands and induces a lower level of technology adoption.  The 
reduction in technology adoption is because low water fee when tL =  attracts some farmers to 
keep the traditional technology rather then switch to the modern technology (tH = ).  Many 
economists view nonlinear discriminative pricing as an efficient pricing method.  However, the Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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introduction of adverse selection seems to produce distortions that a move toward water trading 
might lessen. 
 
<< insert figure 2 here >> 
 
  Considering the level  5.22 θ
∗∗ =  (figure 1.b) at which farmers switch their level of 
technology we can plot in a three-dimensional space the result found in (38), the solution surface 
is depicted in figure 2.a.  A first look at figure 2.a shows that across the line  ij θ θ = , where 
() ,0 ij i j i x θθ θ == , there is opposition of signs in the volume of trade, figure 2.a shows also that 
highest possible, not necessarily feasible, trading occur when ( )
2
,, ij θ θθ θ
∗∗   ∈  . 
In figure 2.b, we provide a contour plot of potential trade levels and a highlight of all 
combinations of () , ij θ θ 's that allow for the adoption of modern irrigation technology, if the 
corresponding water deals for farmer i to farmer j are realized.  The modern irrigation technology 
is adopted when the net gains of technology adoption is higher than the cost of adoption as 
depicted in condition (42). 
  Figure 2.c displays a contour plot of potential water trades with a highlight of the feasible 
levels of trade leading to the adoption of the modern technology (( )
2
,, ij θ θθ θ
∗∗  ∈ ) and those 
of lower level that do not lead to the adoption of the modern technology (( )
2
,, ij θ θθ θ
∗∗  ∉ ) as 
they are only minor adjustment of water use across farmers.  This shows that monetary transfers 
do exist to support feasible trade volumes determined by the trading rule in (38).  The flows of 
trade seem to meet the intuition that farmers with high valuations for water will be water buyers 
and farmers with low valuation for water will be water sellers Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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  The above analysis gives an idea about the possible levels of trade that farmers of 
different types can realize and their technology adoption implication.  Since the final level of 
monetary transfer is determined through negotiation between the seller and the buyer then it is 
not possible to provide its final level.  Nevertheless, for various potential water trade levels 
inducing modern technology adoption could be represented in a contour plot (4.d), where we can 
see that certain water volumes can be traded for up to more or less $50. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper shows that under adverse selection, water trading among farmers can reduce 
the distortion created in allocation of water quotas relative to the situation with full information.  
Adverse selection introduces inefficiencies and distortions because it induces less technology 
adoption and reduces incentives to retire low quality lands.  We showed that trade occurs for two 
reasons.  First, it occurs amongst low type farmers who have already adopted the modern 
irrigation technology and second, it occurs between farmers who did not adopt the modern 
irrigation technology, water is transferred from low type farmers to higher type farmers, and in 
some cases the revenues of water transfer allows for the adoption of the modern technology. 
The results of the numerical analysis showed also that the existence of a second phase of 
trading after the regulator initially allocates the water quotas generates important gains and 
induces additional technology adoption that the initial allocation of water resources could not 
achieve alone. 
In developing the model in this paper, we considered only one-shot games and excluded 
contract renegotiation.  In the context of water rights this assumption is not really restrictive 
since water rights usually span over a long period, therefore each time the contract is designed 
past information is of little relevance.  The pricing of resources under adverse selection can bring Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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insights to the water allocation problem as in many countries the main reason for inefficiency 
comes from the pricing scheme used that for various reasons often leads to an under-pricing of 
water.  A better alternative to pricing would be auction of water rights instead of the 
determination of water quotas by the regulator, and the possibility of having a second market to 
correct for any inefficient allocation of water rights.  Water auctions have been used recently in 
Victoria, Australia (Simon and Anderson).  However, the results of the auction depend on the 
auction rules selected and on the capacity of the regulator to prevent cheating and rigging, in 
addition the implementation of water auctions seems to be more suitable for new water resources 
where no previous rights could be claimed unlike in this paper where prior appropriation rights 
on water are assumed to exist. 
 
APPENDIX 
Incentive compatible contract 
 Let  () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ , () , () ()
tt t
ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θ Π= − − Φ , the profit realized by a farmer i 
when its true type is  i θ  and it announces  ˆ
i θ .  The pair  ( ) { } ˆˆ () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  is a truth-telling 
mechanism if for every  i θ  and  ˆ
i θ  in  , θ θ    , the farmers profit when his type is  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) and 
reveals  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) is greater than his profit when his type is  i θ  (resp.  ˆ
i θ ) and reveals  ˆ
i θ  
(resp. i θ ): 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ () , () () () , () ()
tt t tt t
ii i ii ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θθ θ −− Φ ≥ −− Φ    (43) 
and 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () , () () () , () ()
tt t tt t
ii i ii ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θθ θ −− Φ ≥ −− Φ    (44) Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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 Setting  ( )
t
ii ww θ =  and  ˆ ˆ ()
t
ii ww θ =  and dropping the indices i and t  and using u as 
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 and  ( )
t
ii w θ  is a decreasing function of  i θ . 
  The relation between  ( )
t
ii w θ  and  i θ  being established, we now determine the appropriate 
level of water fee that makes the pair  ( ) { } () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  an incentive compatible contract.  
The first-order condition for truth telling (the value of  ˆ















           ( 4 8 )  
  To make less burdensome the notation we use a dot on top of the variable to designate the 
derivative with respect to  i θ .  Expression (48) implies: 
() () ( ) 2 ()
()2 () () () 0
()
t
ii tt t t
ii ii ii ii t
ii
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−− − = 
∂  
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  If we take  () ( ) () ,() ,
tt t
ii ii i i i wh π θθ θ θ =Π , then using (49) or the envelope theorem, the 
total derivative of 
t
i π  with respect to  i θ  is: 
() 2
tt t t t
ii i i i Ph w b ah w π =−             ( 5 0 )  
Integrating expressions (50) between θ  and  i θ , and equating it to the profit expression in 
(1), then ex-post the optimal water tariff is obtained by a rearrangement: 
() ( ) ( ) ,() ( ) ,( )
i
tt t t t t t t
ii i i ii i i i wP y w h k w c w u h u d u
θ
θ
θπ Φ= − − − ∫        ( 5 1 )  
Optimal Water quota: Full Information vs. Adverse Selection 
  We compare the optimal water quota obtained under full information with the one 
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  A simplification and rearrangement of (52) gives: 
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2 0( ) 2 2 ( 1 )
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−>         ( 5 4 )  
  Expression (54) implies that  2 2 (1 ) 0
t Pbh k g λ − −+ > , which means that expression (53) 
is indeed positive; therefore, the water quota under adverse selection is less than the water quota 
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FIGURE 1: Water quotas and fees, profits, and social gains under full information and adverse selection Water Trading and Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information 
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Figure 2: Water trading and technology adoption feasibility 